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Political Pragmatism and Constitutional Principle:  
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018  
Mark Elliott* and Stephen Tierney** 
 
 
Introduction 
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (‘the Act’ or ‘the Withdrawal Act’) repeals the 
European Communities Act 1972 (‘the ECA’) and in so doing seeks to address 
comprehensively the wide-ranging impact upon the law of the United Kingdom of exit from 
the European Union. The Act’s main purpose is to preserve existing EU law as it applies to 
the UK when it leaves the EU by converting it into domestic law. This is a gargantuan task: 
‘a legal undertaking of a type and scale that is unique and unprecedented.’1 It is estimated 
that approximately 20,000 laws deriving from the EU have been given effect within domestic 
law.2 These need to be assessed and then, as appropriate, repealed, revoked or retained, 
depending upon their relevance and significance. The job of retaining EU law is made more 
challenging both by the timescale involved and because the powers given to the 
Government must be sufficiently flexible to take account of a rapidly changing context, 
including the prospect of an implementation period for the proposed withdrawal 
agreement, up to 31 December 2020,3 and the as yet unknown terms of any new relationship 
agreement between the UK and the EU.  
                                                     
* Professor of Public Law, University of Cambridge; Fellow, St Catharine’s College, Cambridge.  
** Professor of Constitutional Theory, University of Edinburgh. The authors serve as legal 
advisers to the House of Lords Constitution Committee. Some of the material in this article 
draws upon research conducted by the authors when advising the Committee in relation to its 
reports on The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers, 7 March 2017, HL 123, 2016–17, European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report 7 September 2017, HL 19, 2017–19, and  the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill, 29 January 2018, HL 69, 2017–19. However, this article is written in the authors’ 
personal capacities.   
1 Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 29 January 2018, HL 69 2017–19, p.3 
(‘Constitution Committee Report No.3’). 
2 Vaughne Miller, Legislating for Brexit: directly applicable EU law, House of Commons Library 
Briefing Paper, CBP 7863, 12 January 2017. 
3 ‘Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government 
on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's 
While the immediate practical pressures associated with preparing the statute book for exit 
are clear, the likely legacy of the Act falls to be evaluated in terms that are fundamentally 
constitutional in nature. Membership of the EU has had a monumental impact not only upon 
the substantive law of the UK, but also upon the development of fundamental constitutional 
doctrines, principles and practices over more than four decades, affecting our understanding 
of parliamentary supremacy, the relationship between Parliament and Government, the 
constitutional authority of the courts and the creation and development of devolved 
government. Therefore, the implications of the Act go far beyond the immediate task of 
retaining and reordering the domestic effect of EU law. In this article we assess the deeper 
consequences which the Act signifies for four dimensions of the constitution: the rule of law 
and legal certainty, parliamentary supremacy, the relationship between Parliament and 
government and the territorial constitution.  
Before addressing each in turn, we set the scene by reviewing the passage of the Act itself. 
This is particularly notable for the influence which Parliament brought to bear upon its 
terms, not only through plenary debate but also by way of significant committee reports, 
helping to secure important amendments which make the Act much more fit for 
constitutional purpose than the Bill was when it was first published. Significant 
constitutional challenges lie ahead and it will only be in the period after exit that the 
robustness of the constitution will be fully tested by the extraordinary powers which the Act 
contains. But the turbulent passage of the Act itself attests to the vital role Parliament can 
play when fundamental principles of the constitution come under challenge. 
It is necessary to add one further prefatory point, concerning the relationship between the 
Act and the legislation that is to be enacted for the purpose of implementing any transitional 
agreement. It is envisaged by the Government that such legislation — without technically 
redefining “exit day”, which is fixed by the Act as “29 March 2019 at 11.00 p.m.”4 — will in 
substance postpone the domestic legal effect of exit by “saving” the ECA for the duration of 
the transitional period and postponing the creation of the category of “retained EU law” 
until the end of that period.5 These revised arrangements will, of course, only be introduced 
if a transitional agreement is actually reached. It follows that the legal effects of the 
Withdrawal Act that we set out in this article are likely to be felt either at the end of March 
2019 or at the beginning of 2021, depending on whether the operation of the Act is, in effect, 
deferred during transition.  
                                                     
orderly withdrawal from the European Union.’ TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, 8 
December 2017. 
4 EUWA, s. 20(1).  
5 Department for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the Withdrawal Agreement between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union, Cm 9674 (2018).  
The passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (‘the Bill’ or ‘the Withdrawal Bill’) was introduced 
into Parliament on 13 July 2017, shortly before summer recess. This gave parliamentary staff 
and commentators a quiet period in which to digest its implications and hence to inform 
parliamentary debate. A two day second reading debate took place in September 2017 but 
many of the most dramatic debates were reserved for the eight days the Bill spent in 
Commons Committee from 14 November until 20 December. These debates were at times 
fraught, with political issues surrounding Brexit inevitably intertwining with criticism of 
more technical elements of the Bill itself. On several issues the Government undertook to 
think again and on one significant point it was defeated.6 The most turbulent period (from 
the Government’s perspective) occurred after the Bill’s introduction in the Lords on 18 
January 2018. Second reading in the upper house took place on 30-31 January before a 
protracted committee stage that concluded just before Easter recess, followed by detailed 
consideration at a report stage that lasted until early May. It was in these lengthy committee 
and report stages that the most significant amendments were laid. The Lords made 15 
amendments to the Bill. While most of these were eventually reversed in the Commons, the 
Government tabled some 170 of its own amendments in both houses, making explicit 
concession on eight of the Lords amendments,7 but also taking account of numerous 
parliamentary objections raised throughout the passage of the Bill. 
Parliament also delivered robust and proactive scrutiny through its committees. The House 
of Lords Constitution Committee issued three reports, the first of which was anticipatory, 
published in March 2017, before even notification of intention to withdraw under Article 50 
of the Treaty on European Union had been issued. In this report the Committee sought to 
flag up the main constitutional issues which were likely to be raised by the then-
forthcoming Bill and to which Parliament ought to be attentive.8 Having seen the published 
Bill, the Committee produced a second (interim) report to coincide with the Bill’s second 
reading in the House of Commons,9 assessing the Bill in light of its earlier recommendations 
                                                     
6 An amendment to s 9 was passed to give Parliament a role in approving the withdrawal 
agreement. S.9 now provides that the Government’s power to make regulations for the purpose 
of implementing the withdrawal agreement is subject to a statute of Parliament approving the 
final terms of withdrawal. 
7 Institute for Government, ‘EU Withdrawal Bill: amendments and debates’, 21 June 2018 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu-withdrawal-bill-amendments-and-
debates 
8 Constitution Committee, The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ and delegated powers, 7 March 2017, HL 123, 2016–
17 (‘Constitution Committee Report No.1’). 
9 Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: interim report 7 September 2017, HL 
19, 2017–19 (‘Constitution Committee Report No.2’).  
and drawing attention to the fact that many of the problems anticipated by the Committee 
had materialised in the Bill itself.10 The timing of this report is indicative of how the two 
houses can work together when important constitutional issues are at stake. The Lords is 
conscious that it lacks the democratic legitimacy of the Commons, but its committees were 
able to supply the ammunition of constitutional critique which was then fired with more 
political authority by the Commons. The Constitution Committee, following its own inquiry 
into the Bill, and taking account of the preceding Commons stages, published a final and 
detailed report on the Bill ahead of second reading in the Lords.11  
Other committees were also active in assessing many aspects of the Bill — in particular, the 
Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee and Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee, and the Lords’ EU Committee and Delegated Powers and Regulation 
Reform Committee. At the same time scrutiny was enabled by a number of important 
analyses of the Bill’s key provisions produced by the House of Commons library12 and the 
devolved legislatures.13 As we assess the evolution of the Bill in this article, it will be 
apparent just how much its development was the consequence of interplay between 
Parliament in plenary session and the information it derived from its committees, the latter 
also in dialogue directly with the Government through evidence sessions and discussion 
seminars taking place both in public and private as part of ongoing inquiries into the Bill as 
a whole or particular aspects of it.14 
The rule of law and legal certainty 
The central tenet of the Act is that (for the most part) EU law should continue to apply in the 
UK following exit. This key policy is driven by the principle of legal certainty and the 
avoidance of the chaos that would result from suddenly excising the vast body of EU-
derived law from the statute book. This task of retaining EU law is however fraught with 
                                                     
10 The Committee concluded that the Act was “highly complex and convoluted in its drafting 
and structure” and that it left “multiple and fundamental constitutional questions” unanswered: 
Constitution Committee Report No.2, p 2. 
11 Constitution Committee Report No.3. 
12 A list of the Commons Library’s publications concerning the Withdrawal Bill can be found at 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/eu-referendum/legislation/.  
13 Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee, European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
LCM - Interim Report 9 January 2018, SP Paper 255, 1st Report, 2018 (Session 5);  National 
Assembly of Wales, Scrutiny of regulations made under the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 
February 2018. 
14 See for example, Letter from Lord Callanan, Minister of State for Exiting the European Union 
to the Constitution Committee, 11 April 2018? https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/constitution/European-union-withdrawal-bill/Government-response-EU-
(Withdrawal)-Bill-110418.pdf. This engages in detail with Constitution Committee Report No. 3.  
difficulty given the myriad ways in which EU law (per the ECA) has taken effect in domestic 
law: primary legislation, secondary legislation (emanating not only from the ECA but many 
other parent Acts), the direct effect of EU treaty provisions, legislation and general 
principles, and the jurisprudence of domestic and EU judicial organs and regulatory 
agencies. To this end the Act sensibly introduces the concept of ‘retained EU law’. 
Nonetheless, the initial approach taken by the Bill to classifying retained EU law was 
criticised on three main grounds: over-inclusiveness, ambiguity and status.  
The charge of over-inclusiveness derives from the fact that retained EU law encompasses not 
only ‘direct EU legislation’, saved by s. 3, and (other) directly effective EU law (per ECA s. 
2(1)) saved by s. 4, but also ‘EU-derived domestic legislation’ (s. 2). The categories of law 
provided for in ss. 3 and 4 of the Act only have (pre-exit) effect in UK law by virtue of the 
direct effect of EU law and the ECA’s domestic accommodation of that concept. Such EU 
law would therefore automatically cease to have domestic effect when the UK leaves the EU 
and/or Parliament repeals the ECA. In contrast, the category of law provided for by s. 2 
encompasses law that has effect in the UK on a free-standing legislative basis (e.g. 
provisions in primary legislation that give effect to EU directives). Despite the fact that this 
is already domestic law that would not be lost by repeal of the ECA, s. 2(1) of the 
Withdrawal Act brings this category of law within the umbrella concept of ‘retained EU 
law’. In both conceptual and practical terms it is difficult to make sense of this attempt to re-
categorise a body of domestic law as ‘retained EU law’. The Lords Constitution Committee 
took the view that EU-derived domestic legislation under s. 2 should be removed from the 
category of ‘retained EU law’ but the Government disagreed, arguing that law provided for 
in s. 2 required to be classified in this way to ensure that no EU law which the Act seeks to 
retain is lost by falling in the cracks between ss. 2 and 3 and to bring this category of law 
within the interpretive provisions in s. 6 and the ‘correction’ power in s. 8. The latter point is 
arguably particularly important, since it potentially opens up existing domestic law, 
including Acts of Parliament, that does not need to be ‘saved’ by the Act to the extensive 
‘correction’ powers contained therein. We consider the scope of those powers, and their 
constitutional implications, below.  
The second issue raised by the notion of ‘retained EU law’ — namely ambiguity and 
conceptual clarity — arises from the sometimes puzzling and overlapping relationship 
between ss. 2–4. For instance, as the Constitution Committee noted, circumstances can be 
envisaged in which only part of a given EU instrument is reflected in domestic legislation.15 
In such circumstances, those elements of the instrument would form part of domestic law 
under s. 2, while other elements would, if directly effective, form part of domestic law under 
s. 3. Another ambiguity arises in relation to s. 4 which will have the effect of retaining 
directly effective EU law not caught by s. 3. A significant category will be rights derived 
                                                     
15 Constitution Committee Report No.2, para 24; and Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 
21. 
directly from EU Treaties. Once more the issue of conceptual coherence arises. Is it logical to 
attempt to retain within UK law treaty provisions that only make sense in relation to 
membership of the EU, for example those which presuppose a reciprocal arrangement 
between the EU and a Member State? Section 4 could apply to all directly effective treaty 
provisions even if in all practical senses these will have ceased to apply to the UK after exit. 
As with s. 2 it is understandable that the Government sees s. 4 as a “broad ‘sweeper’ 
provision”16 to ensure over-inclusivity in the initial act of retention, the Government 
thereafter using delegated powers to remove unnecessary provisions, but the notion of EU 
treaty provisions continuing to have some effect in UK law surely makes no sense in the 
context of withdrawal from the EU, and raises constitutionally fundamental questions about 
the acceptability of Parliament’s designing a legislative scheme that intentionally leaves so 
much discretion to the executive.  
Section 4 is also ambiguous as to the legal effect of directives which it will incorporate into 
UK law, in particular whether they will have only vertical effect or possibly also horizontal 
effect,17 and also as to whether ss 2 and 4 may, in their over-inclusivity, also serve to overlap 
in the retention of directives, thereby offering two separate sources of retention of the same 
EU-derived legal provision — namely, existing domestic legislation implementing the EU 
provision (saved, if necessary, by s 2) and the EU provision itself (saved by s 4). The 
Constitution Committee concluded that: “The ambiguities in the interpretation and effect of 
clause 4 will inevitably cause legal uncertainty about a fundamental provision of the Act. 
This will undermine one of the Government’s main objectives in bringing forward this Bill. 
The ambiguities need to be resolved.”18     
The third issue — that of status — arises from uncertainty as to whether or not retained EU 
law is properly categorised as primary or secondary legislation. EU-derived domestic 
legislation under s 2 is already ascribed a status depending upon how it was incorporated 
into UK law, and the Bill was amended during its passage through the House of Lords to 
make it clear that EU-derived domestic legislation retains whatever domestic legal status it 
had prior to exit day.19 When the Bill was published, the Government took the view 
however that retained EU law under ss 3 and 4 (what the Constitution Committee called 
“retained direct EU law”20) should be ascribed a status sui generis that is neither primary nor 
                                                     
16 Written evidence from the Department for Exiting the European Union to the Constitution 
Committee, cited by Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 30. 
17 Other areas of ambiguity are discussed by the Constitution Committee Report No.3, paras 33-
38. 
18 Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 38. 
19 See section 7(1).  
20 Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 41. 
secondary legislation,21 albeit that the Act would ascribe such retained EU law a particular 
status for certain purposes22 and, via a consequential provisions clause,23 would authorise 
the Government to designate particular pieces of retained EU law as primary or secondary 
legislation. This was seen by parliamentarians to be an entirely unsatisfactory approach.24 
Retained direct EU law would be transformed into domestic law by virtue of the Act and 
accordingly there seemed to be no good reason not to accord it a recognisable status within 
UK law, while failure to do so would be deeply unsettling to the constitutional 
categorisation of legislation in the United Kingdom as either primary or secondary in 
nature.  
 
In light of this critique, the Constitution Committee took the view that all retained direct EU 
law should have the same legal status for all purposes, namely domestic primary legislation, 
since “directly effective EU law is closely analogous to domestic primary legislation.”25 
Another advantage of such a status would be to render this law less vulnerable to delegated 
powers contained in other legislation.26  However, this suggestion did not find favour with 
the Government, which considered it ‘rigid and inflexible’ because it (for instance) would 
ascribe to technical pieces of EU tertiary legislation an unduly elevated domestic status.27 
Speaking at report stage, Lord Callanan, Minister of State for Exiting the European Union, 
implied that giving such EU law such status would mean that it could only be amended via 
primary legislation. However, that assumption is incorrect, since primary legislation — and 
measures that are deemed to be primary legislation — can of course be amended via 
secondary legislation provided that an Act of Parliament has authorised such amendment 
through a suitably worded Henry VIII clause. The intention of the Constitution Committee’s 
proposal was thus not to render all retained direct EU law invulnerable to amendment via 
secondary legislation, but was rather to make it vulnerable to such amendment only when 
                                                     
21 Written evidence from the Department for Exiting the European Union to Constitution 
Committee, cited Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 42.  
22 For example, the original version of the Bill provided that retained direct EU legislation was to 
be treated as primary legislation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998. The final 
version of the Act is more nuanced, in that it provides that only certain retained direct EU 
legislation should be treated as primary legislation for HRA purposes: sch 8, para 30.   
23 Section 23(1). For discussion of the Government’s positions see Constitution Committee Report 
No.3, paras 67-68. 
24 Constitution Committee Report No.3, paras 69-70. 
25 Constitution Committee Report No.3, paras 51-52 
26 See Constitution Committee Report No.3, paras 58-66. 
27 Lord Callanan, HL Hansard, 23 April 2018, col 1413.  
vires were specifically conferred for that purpose and appropriately regulated and limited. 
Be that as it may, the Government accepted that the Committee had highlighted an 
‘undeniably important issue’,28 but chose to address it in a way that differed in two 
important respects from the Constitution Committee’s proposal.  
First, the Act, following the Government amendments on this point, delineates different 
forms of retained direct EU legislation — ‘principal’ and ‘minor’ — a broad distinction being 
drawn, in practice, between those measures that derive from EU tertiary legislation and 
those, such as regulations and directly effective Treaty provisions, with less humble 
origins.29 This is sensible as far as it goes.  
Second, however, the ‘principal’ and ‘minor’ categories are not, by operation of the Act, 
mapped onto the established domestic distinction between primary and secondary 
legislation (except in respect of the Human Rights Act 1998).30 Rather, s. 7 of the Act, by 
establishing a distinction between principal and minor forms of retained direct EU 
legislation, means for instance that Parliament, when legislating in the future, will be able 
(should it so wish) to provide that delegated powers can be used only in respect of retained 
direct minor EU legislation, or that such powers, if used in respect of retained direct 
principal EU legislation, are to be subject to stricter limits or greater parliamentary 
oversight.  
The upshot is that some of the difficulties that would have arisen from the original Bill’s 
failure to assign a domestic legal status to retained EU law were ameliorated by 
amendments, the key issue of susceptibility to amendment via secondary legislation having 
been clarified. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Act, even in its final form, does not go as 
far as would have been desirable in terms of legal certainty. Indeed, the fact that retained 
direct EU law remains sui generis vis-à-vis the established domestic distinction between 
primary and secondary legislation leaves open some difficult questions that it will now 
necessarily fall to the courts to resolve. A key merit of the Constitution Committee’s 
recommendation — that retained direct EU law be treated as primary legislation enacted on 
exit day — was that it spoke both to questions of hierarchical status and temporality, both of 
which can be crucial when considering the validity of a domestic legal norm with respect to 
other such norms. The Act’s failure to provide clarity on either of these matters means that 
there is continuing uncertainty about, for instance, whether — and, if so, in what 
circumstances — retained direct EU legislation can be challenged via judicial review on the 
                                                     
28 Lord Callanan, ibid, col 1411.  
29 Withdrawal Act, s 7(6).  
30 Schedule 8, para 30 provides that, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, direct principal 
EU legislation is to be treated as primary legislation and that, in general, direct minor EU 
legislation is to be treated as secondary legislation.  
ground of its incompatibility with (other) provisions of domestic law, including (common 
law) grounds of judicial review.  
The combined effect of the vagueness and ambiguities that surround ss 2-4 is likely to 
produce considerable pressure on the courts as they confront the disputes that will 
inevitably arise around the meaning and scope of retained EU law. This difficulty was 
further compounded in the original version of the Bill by a lack of clarity concerning the 
weight domestic courts ought to give to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘CJEU’). The Act provides greater, and welcome, clarity in this regard. It 
draws a distinction between pre- and post-exit CJEU case law. The general effect of s. 6 is 
that while domestic courts are not bound by post-exit CJEU jurisprudence, questions about 
the “validity, meaning or effect” of retained EU law must be decided “in accordance with 
any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law”. “Retained case law” is 
defined in s. 6(7) as including both “retained domestic case law” (pre-exit domestic case law 
that relates to retained EU law) and “retained EU case law” (pre-exit CJEU case law that 
relates to retained EU law).31  
This is a fairly clear position: pre-exit CJEU case law is, in general, binding — which will aid 
the goal of legal continuity after exit. Difficulties arose however in relation to the status of 
post-exit CJEU case law. Here the guidance offered to the courts in the original version of 
the Bill was so vague as to be in effect an abdication of Parliament’s constitutional obligation 
to give clear direction to the courts as to its intention. The original clause 6(2) provided: “A 
court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European 
Court, another EU entity or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so.”32 Senior 
judges made clear that they were troubled by the vagueness of this instruction.33 The 
Constitution Committee offered a detailed alternative approach. The Act, it said, “should 
provide that a court or tribunal shall have regard to judgments given by the CJEU on or after 
exit day which the court or tribunal considers relevant to the proper interpretation of 
retained EU law… [and that]… in deciding what weight (if any) to give to a post-exit 
judgment of the CJEU, the court or tribunal should take account of any agreement between 
                                                     
31 For an explanation of qualifications to this general position see Constitution Committee Report 
No.3, para 130. 
32 Emphasis added. Related uncertainty also attended clause 6(3) which was concerned with 
retained EU law which is modified under exit day. For a discussion of the issues surrounding 
this provision as well as related issues relating to pending cases and the status of CJEU case law 
during any transition period see Constitution Committee Report No.3, paras 143-156.  
33 See evidence to the Constitution Committee by Lord Neuberger in which he expressed a 
concern that courts could be drawn inappropriately into policy areas: Constitution Committee 
Report No.3, paras 134-35 and 137, and a request by Baroness Hale for “Parliament to tell the 
courts ‘what we should be doing … [and] saying how much we should be taking into account’ 
CJEU judgments”. Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 134. 
the UK and the EU which the court or tribunal considers relevant.’34 The Government 
introduced an amendment in light of this recommendation which replaced the 
‘appropriateness’ test with the following formulation, now found in section 7(2) of the Act:  
“A court or tribunal may have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the 
European Court, another EU entity or the EU so far as it is relevant to any matter before 
the court or tribunal.” (emphasis added)  
This provision largely meets the Constitution Committee’s recommendations,35 and was a 
key win for Parliament, demonstrating the instrumental effect parliamentary committees 
have had in clarifying key provisions of the Act and in doing so speaking on behalf of the 
courts in their call for clarity. The importance of clarity in relation to the Act — both as 
regards the post-exit role of CJEU jurisprudence and more generally — is hard to overstate: 
following the UK’s departure from the EU, the Act will, for a considerable time to come, 
form the constitutional basis of a significant element of domestic law. At the same time, 
given the legal and constitutional conundrums that were raised by the UK’s joining the EU 
in the first place, it is unsurprising that the Act, as it seeks (to some extent at least) to 
disentangle domestic and EU law, raises a number of difficult issues. In such circumstances, 
it is imperative that inevitable complexity is not exacerbated by avoidable ambiguity. It 
would be going too far to suggest that all such ambiguity had been excised by the time the 
Bill became an Act; but the final product is certainly a considerable improvement on the 
original version.  
Supremacy in question 
When the Act’s repeal of the ECA takes effect36 — either on 29 March 2019 or at the end of a 
transitional period — the underlying basis upon which EU law has been accorded primacy 
in UK law by domestic courts will be removed. It is well established both in case law and in 
statute that the basis upon which the primacy of EU law has led to the disapplication of 
statutes is the 1972 Act itself.37 It is therefore somewhat confusing that the Withdrawal Act 
perpetuates the idea of the “supremacy” of EU law. Section 5(1) of the Act provides: “The 
principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed 
                                                     
34 Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 142. 
35 although it provides that the court ‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ have regard. It does not seem 
however that much turns on this distinction: the crucial steer to the courts is in the Government’s 
adoption of a relevance test.  
36 Section 1. 
37 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport 
[2014] UKSC 3, Benkharbouche v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; Libya v 
Janah [2017] UKSC 62, and European Union Act 2011 s 18. 
or made on or after exit day.” That much would seem obvious anyway, since it is hard to see 
how the principle of the supremacy of EU law could apply to (necessarily) domestic law made 
following exit from the EU. However, s 5(1) is qualified by s 5(2): “Accordingly, the 
principle of the supremacy of EU law continues to apply on or after exit day so far as 
relevant to the interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment or rule of law 
passed or made before exit day.” 
It is entirely appropriate that the Government should seek to give retained direct EU law 
(per ss 3 and 4) priority over pre-exit, but not post-exit, domestic law. To do otherwise 
would be a source of confusion and may have deleterious retroactive effects. However, the 
use of the term “supremacy” to that end is problematic. The Constitution Committee 
identified three difficulties with the Bill’s supremacy provision.38 Two are concerned with 
the scope of the provision: first, whether it is intended to protect all retained EU law – that 
is, EU-derived domestic legislation under section 2 and retained direct EU law under ss 3 
and 4 – or only the latter category; and, second, how it would interact with the common law, 
given that applying the notion of law being “made” on a particular date is difficult to apply 
to the common law as distinct from legislation. These significant questions remain 
unanswered by the text of the Act, and it will now no doubt fall to the courts to resolve them 
in due course.  
The third issue alighted upon by the Constitution Committee concerns the very concept of 
supremacy. “We find it impossible to see in what sense ‘the principle of the supremacy of 
EU law’, set out in clause 5, could meaningfully apply in the UK once it has left the EU… 
there is no meaningful sense in which ‘the principle of supremacy of EU law’ can apply to 
retained EU law, given that the latter is not EU law.”39 The notion of supremacy sits 
uncomfortably if not incompatibly with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.40 To that 
end the Committee recommended an alternative approach: “that retained direct EU law 
should be made to prevail over pre-exit domestic law by providing in the Act that retained 
direct EU legislation under clause 3 and all law that is converted into domestic law by clause 
4 is to be treated as having the status of an Act of the UK Parliament enacted on exit day.”41 
                                                     
38 Constitution Committee Report No.3, paras 80-103. 
39 Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 80. 
40 See Richard Ekins, 'Constitutional practice and principle in the Article 50 litigation' (2017) 133 
Law Quarterly Review 347 for an interesting account of parliamentary sovereignty in the context 
of the Miller case.  
41 Constitution Committee Report No.3, para 93. This proposal provoked much discussion 
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This approach would have brought what is now s 5 into line with the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty by making clear that retained direct EU law is, after exit day, 
domestic rather than EU law, and hence subject to the doctrines and principles of the UK 
constitution. The Government however rejected this proposal, maintaining the formula of 
“supremacy” in relation to pre-exit EU-derived law,42 and sought to play down the 
significance of this: “The principle [of supremacy] ultimately only applies in a strictly 
limited and diminishing way. Over time, Parliament will pass new legislation which will not 
be subject to the principle. The Government believes that this approach strikes the right and 
sensible balance.”43 
The Committee also commented that if the supremacy principle were to continue, what is 
now s 5(3) should be amended to provide clarification concerning its operation. The 
Government chose not to do so and therefore, in effect, legislation amended after exit day 
can continue to be treated as “supreme”: “Clause 5(3) sets out that when a pre-exit 
enactment or rule of law is modified it can continue to be subject to the supremacy principle, 
if that is consistent with the intention of the modification. The Government maintains that 
this is an entirely sensible approach in order to deliver certainty and continuity.”44 However, 
this view notwithstanding, the scope of the supremacy principle remains unclear: it can bite 
upon pre-exit domestic law that is modified post-exit provided that the application of the 
supremacy principle “is consistent with the intention of the modification”.  
It is convenient at this point to point out a further set of provisions, concerning the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, which lack clarity. The Act on the one hand removes the Charter 
rights from domestic law on exit day45 but on the other provides that this “does not affect 
the retention in domestic law … of any fundamental rights or principles which exist 
irrespective of the Charter.”46 The uncertainty which attends this division is exacerbated by 
the fact the Act expressly excludes any right of action in domestic law based on a failure to 
comply with general principles of EU law.47 There were attempts in the Lords to make 
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different provision in relation to the Charter, for example an amendment proposed by Lord 
Pannick which would have transferred the Charter into domestic law, excluding the 
preamble and Chapter V (which concerns certain rights of citizens living in the EU). But this 
amendment was rejected and no equivalent provision was adopted in the Commons. 
That the Withdrawal Act is itself so opaque when it comes to the whole question of 
supremacy is as unfortunate as it is fitting. It is fitting because that question has itself been 
mired in theoretical uncertainty ever since the UK joined what went on to become the EU. 
Indeed, while, as noted above, the importance of the ECA in assigning supremacy to EU law 
is widely acknowledged, the constitutional theory that makes it possible, in the first place, 
for domestic legislation to accord such priority to EU law — including over other Acts of 
Parliament — has remained the subject of controversy and debate throughout the period of 
the UK’s membership of the EU.48 It is unfortunate that the Withdrawal Act takes an EU law 
concept that is (viewed in domestic constitutional-theoretical terms) already problematic 
and shoehorns it into a domestic legislative regime to which — as a domestic regime — it 
seems so ill-suited. The paradoxical consequence is that while the Act is intended to effect a 
break with the European legal order by reconceptualising EU law as domestic law, the 
supremacy principle — a central feature of that legal order’s architecture — is at the heart of 
the Act. It might be retorted that any resulting uncertainty, theoretical or otherwise, is a 
merely transitory problem that will ebb as retained EU law is, over time, replaced by purely 
domestic law. However, the sheer volume of retained EU law suggests that it will remain a 
highly significant component of domestic law for a long time to come — and so too, 
therefore, will the EU supremacy principle, whatever it turns out to mean shorn of the 
context of EU membership in which it has so far domestically operated.  
Government and Parliament 
Since the task of adapting the statute book for Brexit is so huge, the timescale so tight,49 the 
political terrain so volatile and the agreements that might emerge from ongoing negotiations 
between the UK and EU so unforeseeable, it was inevitable that the Act’s approach would 
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be to vest significant delegated powers in the executive. Nonetheless, the extent to which it 
does so led the Constitution Committee to warn in stark terms about the constitutional risks 
attached to such a transfer of discretionary legislative power to the Government: 
“the number, range and overlapping nature of the broad delegated powers would 
create what is, in effect, an unprecedented and extraordinary portmanteau of 
effectively unlimited powers upon which the Government could draw. They would 
fundamentally challenge the constitutional balance of powers between Parliament 
and Government and would represent a significant—and unacceptable—transfer of 
legal competence. We stress the need for an appropriate balance between the 
urgency required to ensure legal continuity and stability, and meaningful 
parliamentary scrutiny and control of the executive.”50 
The general power to deal with deficiencies in the law arising from withdrawal, to which we 
turn shortly, is set out in section 8. The original version of the Bill contained more specific 
provisions concerning the amendment of UK law to ensure continued compliance with 
international obligations and the implementation of any withdrawal agreement. However, 
during the passage of the Bill through the Lords, the Government took the view that the 
international obligations-related power was no longer needed and so the clause51 was 
removed by amendment in the Lords.52 Meanwhile, although an extensive Henry VIII 
power concerning the implementation of any withdrawal agreement did make it into the 
Act,53 it proved controversial given that authority over the terms and even the date of 
withdrawal seemed to be passing from Parliament to the executive. As a result, in this 
regard the Act differs in significant respects from the original Bill: the power is now “subject 
to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union”.54. The Government has also committed to 
introducing a Withdrawal Agreement Bill to legislate for the outcome of the negotiations 
with the European Union.55 As such, the sting has largely been drawn from power conferred 
by section 9 of the Withdrawal Act.  
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The main provision therefore is s 8. Section 8(1), which in its enacted form is precisely the 
same as the provision set out in the original version of the Bill, provides as follows:  
“A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Minister 
considers appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate— 
(a)  any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively, or 
(b)  any other deficiency in retained EU law, 
arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.” 
When the Bill was first published, this provision drew fierce and sustained criticism. 
Concern arose in relation to four principal matters, relating to the breadth of the power 
generally; the limited extent of matters excluded from its scope; the broad range of 
circumstances in which the negative resolution procedure could be used; and the creation of 
a new ‘made affirmative’ procedure that offered little in the way of parliamentary scrutiny. 
We address each of these matters in turn, and consider the extent to which the constitutional 
concerns created by the original version of this provision remain pertinent in the light of the 
amendments that were made during the passage of the legislation.  
The breadth of s 8 is encapsulated in the word “appropriate” which creates a far-reaching 
and subjective remedial power. Other terms — “failure” and “deficiency” — exacerbate the 
broad scope of the power, appearing somewhat open-ended, particularly when left to the 
subjective opinion of ministers. Such imprecise wording could also present courts with 
considerable difficulties in policing the boundaries of legality in the exercise of such 
powers.56 Parliamentary critics focused in particular upon the ‘appropriateness’ criterion, 
which self-evidently renders the power wider and more flexible than a ‘necessity’ test. In the 
light of such concerns, the Bill was amended during the Report stage in the House of Lords 
such that the power would be exercised only so as to “make such provision as is necessary” 
to address deficiencies in retained EU law arising from Brexit. However, this amendment 
did not ultimately survive, and so the formula contained in the original version of the Bill — 
which turns upon what Ministers consider to be appropriate — is the one found in s 8(1) of 
the Act.  
The upshot is a power that is undeniably broad, albeit that it is certainly not infinitely broad. 
For one thing, merely framing a ministerial power in subjective terms does not immunise it 
against all judicial scrutiny,57 while the Supreme Court’s decision in the Public Law Project 
case suggests that we cannot assume that extremely broadly framed powers will be taken by 
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the courts to be as wide as their language suggests.58 Features of the Act that were added 
through amendments may also have the effect of, in practice, curtailing ministerial latitude 
when it comes to the exercise of these powers. For instance, in contrast to the original 
version of the Bill, the Act now provides that whenever s 8(1)59 is used to make a statutory 
instrument in circumstances where the instrument or a draft has to be laid before 
Parliament, a ministerial duty to make an ‘explanatory statement’ arises.60 Such statements 
must address a range of matters,61 including why the Minister considers there to be ‘good 
reasons’ for the instrument (or draft), why it is a ‘reasonable course of action’, the effect of 
any relevant impact upon certain equalities-related legislation and, where relevant, why 
there are good reasons for the creation of any criminal offence and associated penalties. Such 
requirements broadly reflect those that were added to the Sanctions and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act 201862 following a recommendation made by the Constitution Committee.63 
The explanatory statements regime was similarly added to the Withdrawal Act after the 
Committee recommended amendments along those lines.64 
Along with general concerns about the breadth of the power under what became s 8 of the 
Act, a second — related but more particular — concern arose upon publication of the Bill 
regarding the paucity of matters that were specifically exempted from its ambit. The 
Government sought to justify the limited nature of specific exclusions by indicating that the 
powers it contains are only intended to be used to make technical rather than policy 
changes. The Government offered the assurance that the Act “does not aim to make major 
changes to policy or establish new frameworks in the UK beyond those which are necessary 
to ensure the law continues to function properly from day one”.65 But in the absence of a 
statutory restriction to this effect, there was a clear possibility that the section could be used 
to bring about significant policy changes, and on this basis the Constitution Committee 
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recommended that the s 8 power should be “more tightly circumscribed” such that it could 
not be used to effect “major policy changes”.66 While no such general distinction between 
policy and technical changes made its way into the Act, the scope for using s 8 to make 
changes of the former type was narrowed, albeit modestly, by other amendments; in 
particular, the Act itself, unlike the original version of the Bill, provides that the s 8 power 
cannot be used to create new public authorities,67 or amend the devolution statutes for 
Scotland and Wales68, a point to which we return in the next part of the article. 
A third area of concern relates to Parliament’s role in relation to the making of regulations. 
In the original version of the Bill, the default position was that most regulations under s 8 
were to be made by way of negative resolution procedure, with affirmative procedure 
required only in relation to a very narrow range of matters.69 This was so despite the fact 
that s 8 confers a general Henry VIII power, such that regulations under s 8(1) “may make 
any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament”.70 Self-evidently, the broader the 
power (in terms of the range of uses to which it can be put) and the deeper the power (in 
terms of is availability not merely to make technical changes but also to make substantial 
changes to policies set out in primary legislation), the more pressing concerns become about 
parliamentary oversight and control of its exercise. Having been unsuccessful in arguing 
that s 8 powers should only apply to technical changes, the Constitution Committee offered 
an ancillary recommendation that at the very least “the Act should provide for the 
application of the affirmative procedure in relation to any measure which involves the 
making of policy.”71 While this recommendation was also unsuccessful, another of the 
Committee’s recommendations in this area met with greater success. Thus, while there is 
only a very limited range of circumstances in which the affirmative procedure must 
necessarily be used when statutory instruments are made under s 8(1),72 the Bill now makes 
provision for a ‘sifting’ process in respect of statutory instruments that do not automatically 
fall within the affirmative procedure.73 Where the Government does not voluntarily subject 
such measures to the affirmative procedure, committees of each House — within a tight 
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timeframe of ten sitting days74 — can recommend its use. The sifting procedure also applies 
to regulations in relation to transitional and consequential matters under section 23.75 
Importantly, however, such recommendations are not binding upon Ministers: they can 
choose, in the face of such recommendations, to press ahead with the negative procedure, 
albeit that they are required (before the instrument is made) to make a statement explaining 
why they do not agree with the sifting committee76 (or, if no such statement is made, to 
make a statement explaining that failure).77 The result is that while the Act equips 
Parliament to exercise a degree of influence in this area, the non-binding nature of sifting 
committees’ recommendations denies Parliament anything approaching true control in this 
regard.78 
A fourth issue with s 8 is that the Act introduces a new ‘made affirmative’ or ‘urgent 
deficiency’ procedure,79 which allows an instrument which would otherwise be subject to 
affirmative procedure to be made and come into force without any opportunity for 
parliamentary debate. An instrument may be made without a draft being laid before 
Parliament if it “contains a declaration that the Minister of the Crown concerned is of the 
opinion that, by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the regulations without a draft 
being so laid and approved.”80 Such an instrument ceases to have effect after 28 days unless 
it is approved by affirmative procedure in both Houses within this period.81 In other words, 
if the Government wishes to maintain such a measure after 28 days then regular affirmative 
procedure is required. The Government justified this procedure in relation to instruments 
that must be made urgently and in light of the particular circumstances of exit. Despite the 
fact that the life of such regulations was tightly time bound, the Constitution Committee still 
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called for this novel procedure to be “far more tightly drawn and controlled in the Act.”82 
This procedure has not been withdrawn. It also appears that the statement procedure is not 
required when these instruments are first made. The statement procedure provided for in 
Schedule 7 para 28 applies when draft instruments are to be laid before Parliament. But para 
5(8) provides that instruments can be made without being laid in cases of “urgency”.  
This part of the Act demonstrates perhaps more than any other the influence Parliament 
brought to bear on the Bill. Section 8 in its published form was in effect an open-ended 
power. It has now been more tightly circumscribed, while related powers have either been 
considerably weakened or withdrawn altogether. The way in which each of the main 
criticisms levelled at section 8 were responded to by the Government demonstrates how 
detailed and constructive committee scrutiny can help foster meaningful dialogue between 
Parliament and Government, often founded upon the recognition of a  common interest in 
producing legislation that is both workable in practice and constitutionally legitimate. The 
Act does still accord broad delegated powers to the Government — parliamentary 
committees accepted that the circumstances of Brexit would make this inevitable83 — but  
co-operative dialogue surrounding section 8 and related provisions persuaded the  
Government to rein-in the Bill’s delegated powers and subject these to more extensive 
scrutiny, resulting in to the likelihood of much firmer parliamentary control.  
Devolution and the Territorial Constitution 
One of the most fraught debates during the passage of the Act concerned how to empower 
the devolved administrations to prepare their respective territories for exit, and how to deal 
with the repatriation of powers from the EU which fall wholly or in part within devolved 
competence. Section 11 addresses the former issue and does so by conferring upon the 
devolved administrations power to make regulations which are similar in scope to those 
accorded to UK ministers by sections 8 and 9,84 all in the context of devolved competence,85 
tailoring these powers to the respective powers of each of the devolved territories.86 Powers 
under section 11 may also be exercised by UK ministers “acting jointly with a devolved 
authority”.87 Upon publication of the Bill, the exercise of the powers under section 11 were 
tightly restricted by a general obligation to gain the consent of UK ministers. The Bill was 
amended to narrow consent constraints to those situations where consent is already 
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required under the devolution statutes.88 Otherwise, there is only a duty to consult with the 
Secretary of State in relation to matters touching upon reciprocal arrangements between the 
UK and the EU.89 As noted above, another amendment to the Bill provides that section 8 
powers cannot be used to amend the devolution statutes.90 
Section 12 proved to be the more significant and controversial provision. This section 
amends the main devolution statutes in order to regulate devolved competence in relation to 
retained EU law. In its initial form, s. 12 provided that an Act of a devolved legislature could 
not modify retained EU law unless the modification would have been within the legislative 
competence of the devolved legislature before exit day. This left to the discretion of the UK 
Government, through Orders in Council, the power to determine when and how to release 
areas of legislative competence to the devolved administrations. The UK Government 
argued that these powers were required until common frameworks, designed to protect the 
UK’s internal market, were put in place.91 Nonetheless, this provision was heavily criticised 
as out of step with the spirit of the devolution settlements. The Scottish and Welsh 
administrations argued that unless powers returning from Brussels fell automatically to the 
devolved territories their powers to make policy would be unduly restricted, while a risk 
existed of common frameworks being imposed upon them.92 As a consequence, they 
threatened to refuse consent to the Bill if these provisions were not substantially amended.93  
Section 12 was entirely rewritten in light of criticism of the provision, which included 
concerns voiced also by parliamentary committees.94 The final terms of section 12 impose a 
far more tightly contained restriction upon devolved competence.  There is now a 
presumption that retained EU law within devolved competence will remain within the remit 
of the devolved legislatures. The UK Government retains a power to restrict devolved 
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competence by way of regulations but the onus is on Whitehall to specify precise powers it 
intends to protect from modification by Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh. Before laying 
regulations to “freeze” certain areas within exclusive UK competence, UK ministers are 
required to seek agreement from the devolved governments. Draft regulations must be 
published and devolved legislatures given 40 days to make a “consent decision” before a 
draft is laid before Parliament. A copy must be sent to the administration in question.95 If 
devolved consent is not given and Parliament nonetheless decides to approve a particular 
regulation, the minister will have a further duty to make a statement explaining why it has 
decided to lay the draft regulation without the devolved legislature’s consent.96 Section 12 
also provides that these powers are time-limited. The power to make regulations under 
section 12 will end two years after exit day and the regulations themselves are subject to a 
five year sunset clause.97   
The final form of section 12 satisfied the Welsh Government which recommended legislative 
consent to the Bill.98 The changes had been negotiated through the Joint Ministerial 
Committee on European Negotiations (JMC (EN)) and an intergovernmental agreement was 
issued endorsing the amendments.99 This also contains a political commitment by the UK 
Government not to introduce legal changes for England where the devolved administrations 
are prevented from legislating by section 12.100 The Scottish Government however advised 
the Scottish Parliament to refuse consent101 and in the end its legislative consent to the Bill 
was not forthcoming.102 One cause for complaint was that very little opportunity was 
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afforded the Commons to debate the final form of section 12. When the Bill returned from 
the Lords for final Commons consideration, attention focused almost entirely upon the 
‘meaningful vote’ issue. Only some 15 minutes was made available to discuss the devolution 
provisions. SNP MPs accordingly staged a dramatic walk-out from the chamber in protest.103 
The lack of time available to Parliament to consider and debate the potentially huge practical 
as well as constitutional implications of the new draft represents a serious procedural 
shortcoming in the passage of the Bill, and remains one of the most glaring constitutional 
defects in the Bill’s passage. 
In the course of parliamentary debate it became clear that Northern Ireland was a special 
case, given that the Belfast Agreement also involves the Republic of Ireland and that its 
terms are underpinned by reference to the joint commitment of the UK and Ireland to EU 
law; an important legal backdrop to the cross-border arrangements for which the Agreement 
provides. The Constitution Committee voiced a particular concern that this Agreement — 
through the Northern Ireland Act 1998 — could in fact be vulnerable to the powers 
contained in s.9 of the Withdrawal Act.104 A new provision, section 10, makes clear that UK 
ministers must exercise powers under the Act in a way that is compatible with the terms of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (although this stops short of explicitly restricting the use of s.9 
powers to amend the Northern Ireland Act or any other devolution statute).105 These must 
also respect the interim agreement between the UK and the EU secured in December 2017 
which makes particular reference to the Northern Ireland border and citizenship issues.106 
The devolution provisions illustrate again how the Government was willing to transform 
the published bill radically in light of criticism and in order to secure (at least partial) 
devolved consent. Nonetheless, the Act promises to add considerably to the complexity of 
the devolution settlements and the nature of intergovernmental arrangements in the UK. 
Section 11, although less politically controversial than section 12, replicates the problems of 
executive discretion presented by section 8. There will be a considerable strain upon the 
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resources of devolved legislatures as they attempt to monitor the use of s 12 powers by 
devolved executives, while also tracking developments at UK level which may impact upon 
devolution. The passage of the Act without the consent of the Scottish Parliament certainly 
raises an important issue of constitutional principle, but what has been underexplored is 
how the entire formula of section 12 is likely to transform and make more obscure what has 
hitherto been a fairly straightforward ‘reserved powers’ model for Scotland (and 
increasingly for Wales per the Wales Act 2017). Any attempt to detect which powers are 
devolved and which are reserved in relation to retained EU law will now involve the 
intricate interplay of the devolution statutes, the Withdrawal Act, regulations made under 
both and the legal status of any agreed common frameworks. This regime at sub-state level 
will surely exacerbate the problems of legal certainty to which we drew attention in relation 
to sections 2-4. While stressing high level constitutional concerns with ss 11 and 12 it is 
important also to note that greater problems in the longer term may involve practical issues 
of complexity and confusion.  
Conclusions 
The Withdrawal Act highlights a number of respects in which the UK constitution has been 
placed under strain by the legal and political complexities of Brexit. If the referendum that 
took place in June 2016 was about whether the UK should “take back control” of its own 
affairs from the EU, the passage of the Act forced confrontation of difficult questions about 
who should have charge of the process of re-establishing that “control”, as well as about the 
form that the post-exit legal and constitutional landscape will take. The passage of the 
legislation thus implicated a series of interlocking legal, political and constitutional issues 
concerning the respective balances of power between the executive and Parliament and 
between UK and devolved institutions, along with a set of highly technical matters 
regarding the position of “retained EU law” as an element of the post-exit domestic legal 
system.  
In its original form, the Withdrawal Bill was open to criticism on four principal 
constitutional grounds. It raised but provided few clear answers to a series of hard questions 
about the conceptual nature and place of “retained EU law”, to an extent that risked 
considerable confusion and which may have jeopardised the rule-of-law axiom of legal 
certainty. At the same time, by maintaining the notion of the “supremacy of EU law”, the 
Bill took a concept that, at best, sat uneasily with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
throughout the UK’s membership of the EU and clumsily sought to graft it onto a post-exit, 
purely domestic legal order to which it has no obvious application. Meanwhile, the Bill 
would have supplied the executive arm of government with extraordinary powers to 
rewrite the statute book in the name of addressing “deficiencies” arising from exit. And, at 
least on one view, it affronted basic principles governing the operation of the territorial 
constitution by diverting repatriated powers away from the devolved capitals and keeping 
them in London until decisions were taken to reallocate them. In these ways, the Bill raised 
fundamental questions about and arguably presented challenges to a trinity of key 
constitutional principles — the rule of law, the sovereignty of Parliament and the separation 
of powers — as well as to the value, lying at the heart of the modern devolution settlements, 
of territorial governance and autonomy.  
Against this background, any constitutional evaluation of the Act necessarily occurs at two 
levels. It must be concerned with the substance of the Act, and the extent to which the 
constitutional difficulties raised by the original version of the Bill were solved by the time 
that the Bill became an Act. But it must also be concerned with the processes whereby any 
such resolutions were achieved, and, in particular, with the adequacy or otherwise of the 
processes that sought, as the legislation progressed through Parliament, to render it more 
consistent with the demands of constitutionalism.  
As to the former, we have shown in this article that the Act is an improvement on the Bill as 
it was originally introduced into Parliament. But that is so only to a limited extent. In each of 
the areas of difficulty identified above, the progress made during the passage of the Bill 
arguably did not go as far as would have been desirable in constitutional terms. Thus, for 
instance, while some of the difficulties regarding the status of retained direct EU legislation 
were partly addressed through the introduction of the distinction between “principal” and 
“minor” forms of such law, the basic conceptual relationship between retained EU law and 
established categories of domestic law remains incompletely addressed by the Act. 
Similarly, the Act, like the original version of the Bill, remains unclear as to how the 
principle of the supremacy of EU law will apply, and what its implications for the 
traditional notion of parliamentary sovereignty will be, when EU law is excised from the 
domestic legal system upon the UK’s departure from the EU. As far as the separation of 
powers is concerned, the Act represents progress when compared to the Bill as introduced, 
the ministerial powers created by s 8 being subject to greater limits, and the arrangements 
for parliamentary scrutiny of their exercise being more thorough, than the Bill’s framers had 
originally contemplated. Nevertheless, sight should not be lost of the still-extraordinary 
nature the powers — judged by reference both to their breadth and their potency — that the 
Act confers, supplemented by equivalent powers allocated to the devolved executives. 
Meanwhile, the rewriting of what became s. 12 of the Act in an attempt to accommodate 
concerns raised by the Scottish and Welsh Governments certainly resulted in arrangements 
that are more sensitive to the realities of the UK’s modern, multi-layered constitution. There 
are different ways to view the final formulation. The fact that the Act was ultimately passed 
in spite of the Scottish Parliament’s unwillingness to grant legislative consent arguably 
flouts a fundamental principle at the heart of the territorial constitution. On the other hand, 
the acceptance of the provision by the National Assembly of Wales may suggest that it 
achieves the only feasible balance between respecting devolved prerogatives while planning 
for the uncertainties of Brexit. Whichever view is taken, the relationship between devolution 
and Brexit promises to be a minefield of complexity for years to come. 
As to the adequacy of the processes whereby the Bill was, at least to some extent, improved 
upon in constitutional terms, two main points fall to be made. The first concerns the way in 
which the relationship between UK and devolved institutions was managed, in particular in 
relation to the destination of repatriated powers falling within devolved areas of 
competence.  Throughout the passage of the Bill, channels of intergovernmental discussion 
were kept open but these tended to substantiate longstanding criticism of the opacity of UK 
intergovernmental relations and of the dominant position of central government within the 
system.107 Nonetheless these deliberations did eventually result in the final formulation of s. 
12. A greater source of concern was that this radically new provision – with all the possible 
complexity which is likely to attend its use - was presented to Parliament as a fait accompli, 
with almost no time made available to debate its terms as the closing stages of the Bill’s 
passage took place in the Commons. Although this was a consequence of Parliament’s 
demand to debate the ‘meaningful vote’ issue at length, it also highlights how a lack of 
proper coordination of parliamentary time allowed vital issues surrounding the territorial 
constitution to be side-lined at a crucial moment in the Bill’s passage.  
This issue is but one which directly implicates Parliament — the body before which the Bill 
was placed, and which ultimately produced the Withdrawal Act. The task that Parliament 
faced in considering this legislation was an undeniably daunting one, not least because of 
the astonishing complexity both of the Bill itself and of the underlying legal and 
constitutional issues that it engaged. In such circumstances, floor-of-the-House scrutiny was 
always going to be of limited utility, the prospect of detailed engagement with the 
interminable but crucial minutiae of the Bill being distinctly limited. By contrast, 
parliamentary committees supplied much more effective scrutiny, engaging with precisely 
the points of detail that were so unsuited to plenary consideration. Indeed, it was in relation 
to such matters that the Government was most ready to concede ground, acknowledging the 
force of parliamentary committees’ critiques of the Bill and — sometimes — being prepared 
to accept, or at least respond constructively to, their suggestions.  
From a popular perspective, however, the mettle of Parliament — and its capacity to stand 
up to the executive and assert its sovereign constitutional authority — was most obviously 
tested in relation to the ‘meaningful vote’ issue. As the Bill progressed through Parliament, 
the notion that such a vote should take place on the terms of withdrawal gathered a 
considerable head of steam and ultimately became the key political battleground between 
the Government and (elements of) Parliament. The adequacy of the provision108 ultimately 
made by the Act on the meaningful vote issue is questionable, not least because the timing 
of any such vote is likely to mean that Parliament is presented with little more than a fait 
accompli, the choice being between acceptance of whatever deal the UK Government and the 
EU have agreed or the stark alternatives of a ‘hard Brexit’ by operation of Article 50(3) TEU.  
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108 See section 13. 
However, important though the question is, our primary concern here is not with the 
adequacy or otherwise of the ‘meaningful vote’ provision made by the Act. Rather, for our 
purposes, and by way of conclusion, the important point is the way in, and the time at, 
which Parliament confronted this matter which is pivotal to the whole question of control 
over the Brexit process and to where institutional authority lies to determine what Brexit 
ultimately amounts to. Only the most charitable observer could suggest that by enacting the 
‘meaningful vote’ provisions in summer 2018 — only eight months before the two-year 
period set by Article 50 expired — Parliament had put itself in anything approximating to 
the driving seat. Back at the beginning of 2017, when the Supreme Court gave judgment in 
the Miller case,109 that certainly was the position in which Parliament found itself, the 
Government having been denied legal authority to activate the withdrawal process absent 
primary legislation permitting it to do so. It is hard to resist the inference that, whether they 
were prepared to admit it or not, legislators who sought to assert parliamentary control 
through the medium of a ‘meaningful vote’ requirement in the Withdrawal Act were doing 
little more than closing the stable door long after the horse had bolted: something that 
undoubtedly occurred when Parliament hastily enacted legislation in the immediate 
aftermath of Miller giving the Prime Minister the broadest of discretionary powers to trigger 
Article 50:110 something that she, in turn, wasted no time in doing.  
None of this is to suggest that Parliament should, either in early 2017 following Miller or 
subsequently, have sought to frustrate the Government in seeking to give effect to the 
outcome of the referendum. Rather, it goes to the question of where institutional authority 
and responsibility lies. Events from the Miller case through to the completion of the 
Withdrawal Act’s passage provide a vivid illustration of the resilience of executive power. In 
the immediate aftermath of the referendum, the Government made it clear that it intended 
to trigger Article 50 and that it planned to do so without seeking parliamentary 
authorisation. When this assertion of executive authority was rebuffed by the Supreme 
Court in Miller, Parliament was handed a golden opportunity to stake its claim in relation to 
the Brexit process. It could, for instance, have legislated so as to allow the Government to 
trigger Article 50 only once it had obtained parliamentary approval of its negotiating 
objectives. Instead, Parliament presented the Government with a blank cheque that was 
promptly cashed, thereby investing the executive with just the sort of broad, discretionary 
authority that Miller had seemingly denied it. The broader constitutional implications of the 
Miller case are doubtless substantial; but Parliament’s response to it rendered it, in political 
terms, little more than a hiccup in an executive-dominated Brexit process.  
The Brexit story so far thus reveals an old truth about the British constitution: that while 
executive authority is in principle rightly limited by law, as the Miller case (whatever one’s 
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view as to the correctness of the decision) illustrates, the true limits of executive authority 
are in the gift of a Parliament whose legal capacity to vest power in the executive is 
unlimited, and whose political willingness to do so often knows few bounds.111 That much is 
apparent, at a general level, from the way in which Parliament reacted to Miller and, in more 
particular terms, from the extravagance of the powers vested in Ministers by the Act (even if 
they are not quite as outlandish as those that were first contemplated by the Bill). Brexit may 
have been proposed as a means of reclaiming national sovereignty, and Miller may have 
been intended to strike a blow for parliamentary sovereignty. Yet it is the executive that will 
set the United Kingdom’s negotiating position with the EU and which will be effectively free 
to reach agreement on the terms of Brexit; it is the executive that will take the lead when it 
comes to recasting the domestic statute book post-exit; and it is also the (UK) executive that 
will be pivotal in determining how and when repatriated powers in devolved areas flow to 
Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh.  
That these things are being done pursuant to authority conferred by a supreme legislature 
places their legality beyond doubt. But that very fact should give us pause to reflect critically 
on how Parliament has wielded its sovereign authority in this context. With great power 
goes great responsibility — including a responsibility to legislate in a way that is faithful to 
the requirements of constitutional principle and that ensures executive accountability. It is 
against this background that the victories secured by Parliament, as it sought to bend the 
Withdrawal Bill to the demands of constitutionalism, must be viewed. Those victories are 
certainly not trivial, and the Act that was ultimately made is a considerable improvement 
upon the Bill that was originally introduced. Nevertheless, they should not blind us to the 
fact that to the extent that “control” is being newly exerted in the wake of referendum, it is 
the executive that finds itself in the driving seat. 
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